Hodeidah Agreement Yemen
On 13 December 2018, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres participated in the conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement. The agreement consisted of three ancillary agreements: the Hodeida Agreement; agreement with prisoners; and the half-page Taiz Understanding. The Hodeidah Agreement, supported by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 2451 (2018) and 2452 (2019), included several issues with a three-week deadline, including: (1) an immediate ceasefire; (2) the transfer and not the withdrawal of forces; (3) the establishment of a United Nations-led Transfer Coordination Committee (RAC); (4) the removal of fortifications and the stopping of military reinforcements; (5) the demining of the ports of Hodeidah, and not of the city; (6) an increased presence of the United Nations; (7) as well as security and economic measures. Second, as problematic as the strategic ambiguity of the agreement is, it is also becoming increasingly clear that it is part of a broader plan to normalize the role of the Houthis. The “local security forces” and the “central bank branch” that were supposed to collect revenue in Hodeidah were not specified in the agreement and remain unresolved, requiring greater “flexibility,” according to Griffiths. However, if an observer took a step back and looked at the chain of events that the UN envoy helped trigger, he would undoubtedly see a model: the normalization of the Houthis. The review also covers challenges in translating the overall framework of the Hodeidah Agreement into action plans for its implementation, which has necessitated ongoing negotiations between the parties overseen by the JRC President and UN Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths. This includes the need to reach an agreement on local security forces that will secure the city and ports before the deployment of forces from the city of Hodeidah begins. It warns that even after agreement on outstanding issues, full implementation, including demining of military events and mines, will involve a long-term commitment. This is where the Stockholm Agreement helps with regard to the government of Yemen and the Houthi fighters who have agreed to the terms. Evidence that the Parties to the Agreement were motivated and influenced by human rights considerations, combined with the explicit recognition that the provisions of the Agreement are humanitarian in nature and in conformity with international human rights law, indicates the recognition of human rights and humanitarian responsibility with respect to indiscriminate attacks against civilians, access to humanitarian assistance; and abuse and torture during arbitrary and unlawful detention.
More importantly, it also creates a basis for victims to hold these parties accountable for the breach of these obligations. A new wave of violence has erupted in the governorate at the heart of Yemen`s Stockholm Agreement, threatening the ceasefire signed in December 2018 to end fierce fighting in the port city of Hodeidah. Two years after this agreement, more than a thousand people (1,249) have been maimed or killed by the armed conflict in Hodeidah governorate. This single governorate accounts for nearly a quarter of all deaths and injuries in Yemen since the signing of the agreement. New figures show that this increase in violence is taking place in different parts of the country. October was the most violent month of the entire year, bringing the total number of casualties in Yemen since the deal to 5,267 – or 7 civilians a day. 1 Press release by the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, one year after the Stockholm Agreement: Where are we today? (13 December 2019), at osesgy.unmissions.org/year-after-stockholm-agreement-where-are-we-now. A review of each part of the agreement suggests that international attention to the detection of serious international crimes and human rights violations in Yemen has played a role in influencing the parties` actions to accept the terms and conditions they eventually agreed in Sweden.
(September 16, 2019), in www.mei.edu/publications/yemens-peace-process-hodeida-agreement-never-was. The Stockholm Agreement consists of three separate agreements: first, an agreement on the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa; secondly, a prisoner exchange agreement; and thirdly, the understanding of the city of Taiz. Unfortunately, little progress has been made in the implementation of these agreements since 2018. At the time of its conclusion, the Hodeidah ceasefire was hailed as a crucial step towards a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. To ensure that the ceasefire is respected, UN Security Council Resolution 2452 sent a 75-member civilian observer mission – the UN Mission in Support of the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) – to Hodeidah for an initial period of six months. It states that the agreement is the result of reports of widespread human rights violations in prisons, reaching the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and led to the conclusion in the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Group of Eminent Experts that “the Governments of Yemen, of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia” as well as the “de facto authorities for the international community” Human rights violations, “which “constitute the following war crimes: rape, degrading and cruel treatment, torture and outrages upon personal dignity”. [29] 6 Stephanie Nebehay, Yemen Peace talks fail in Geneva after Houthis fail to show, Reuters (Sept. . . . .